The financing of bank resolution - who should provide the required liquidity?
This paper addresses two distinct yet interconnected problems. The first is whether the provision of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) on an individual bank basis should be centralised within the European Central Bank (ECB) and the second is whether existing liquidity financing arrangements are fit for the role. The paper argues that ELA centralisation would not require Treaty amendment and that a liquidity backstop is needed. However the latter cannot be provided by the ECB due to the prohibition of monetary financing and other Treaty and EU law requirements. The choice of the EU entity which should be entrusted with the specific mandate will largely depend on the characteristics the facility would take. The paper considers such characteristics and analyses which authority may best fit that role. The paper also suggests that a well-structured facility could have a positive broader macroprudential impact, and that a fine balance needs to be struck between the risk of moral hazard and the beneficial effect this facility may have on market confidence.
Analyse approfondie
Auteur externe
Costanza A Russo Rosa M. Lastra, Queen Mary University of London
À propos de ce document
Type de publication
Domaine politique
Mot-clé
- DROIT
- droit civil
- droit de l'Union européenne
- entreprise en difficulté
- ENTREPRISE ET CONCURRENCE
- FINANCES
- gestion administrative
- gestion du risque
- institution financière
- institutions financières et crédit
- libre circulation des capitaux
- norme technique
- organisation de l'entreprise
- politique commerciale
- PRODUCTION, TECHNOLOGIE ET RECHERCHE
- risque financier
- réglementation financière
- solvabilité financière
- surveillance du marché
- technologie et réglementation technique
- union bancaire de l’UE
- UNION EUROPÉENNE
- ÉCHANGES ÉCONOMIQUES ET COMMERCIAUX
- économie monétaire
- élaboration du droit de l'UE