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Publicado em 20-02-2020

Implementation of macro-regional strategies

20-02-2020

While each macro-regional strategy is unique in terms of the countries it brings together and the scope of its policies, they all share the same common aim: to ensure a coordinated approach to issues that are best tackled together. Building on the success of the pioneering 2009 European Union strategy for the Baltic Sea region, this form of cooperation has since become firmly embedded in the EU's institutional framework, with four strategies now in place, covering a total of 19 Member States and ...

While each macro-regional strategy is unique in terms of the countries it brings together and the scope of its policies, they all share the same common aim: to ensure a coordinated approach to issues that are best tackled together. Building on the success of the pioneering 2009 European Union strategy for the Baltic Sea region, this form of cooperation has since become firmly embedded in the EU's institutional framework, with four strategies now in place, covering a total of 19 Member States and 8 third countries. Every two years, the European Commission publishes a report to assess the implementation of these strategies, most recently in 2019. With the views of stakeholders and other players helping to complete the picture, it is possible to identify a number of challenges common to all macro-regional strategies in areas such as governance, funding, political commitment and the need to be more results oriented. This, in turn, has helped focus discussions on the future role of macro-regional strategies within the post 2020 cohesion policy framework. For while recent months have seen the idea of a fifth macro-regional strategy resurface, with negotiations now under way on the cohesion policy architecture beyond 2020, the future position of macro-regional strategies within this framework looks set to be the key issue in the coming months for all actors involved in the EU’s macro-regional strategies. Parliament has actively taken part in this debate, through its participation in trilogues on the cohesion policy package, and its 2018 resolution on the implementation of macro-regional strategies. The current Croatian EU Presidency has also committed to focusing on achieving the goals of macro-regional strategies and ensuring their complementarity with cohesion policy as part of its programme, helping to keep the issue high on the political agenda. Much will depend, however, on the outcome of the ongoing multiannual financial framework (MFF) negotiations, which will be critical not only for macro-regional strategies but also for the future shape of cohesion policy in general. This is an updated edition of a Briefing from September 2017.

Future EU-UK trade relationship

20-02-2020

The withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU) came into effect on 1 February 2020, following the large majority gained by the Conservative Party, led by Boris Johnson, in the UK general election in December 2019. The transition period began on the same day and is due to run until the end of 2020. During this period, although no longer part of the EU institutions, the UK remains in the customs union and single market, and within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of ...

The withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU) came into effect on 1 February 2020, following the large majority gained by the Conservative Party, led by Boris Johnson, in the UK general election in December 2019. The transition period began on the same day and is due to run until the end of 2020. During this period, although no longer part of the EU institutions, the UK remains in the customs union and single market, and within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU (with some exceptions). Negotiations during the transition period are aimed at reaching agreements that will shape the future EU-UK relationship in a range of domains, and especially that of trade. In the Political Declaration accompanying the Withdrawal Agreement, the EU and the UK 'agree to develop an ambitious, wide-ranging and balanced economic partnership'. However, some major obstacles have surfaced. The UK insists that it is unwilling to submit to EU Court of Justice jurisdiction, and demands autonomy in its regulatory and trade policies. The UK indicates that it seeks a free trade agreement similar to that agreed between the EU and Canada: comprehensive, but very different to the previous relationship. The EU has taken note of the UK objectives, but emphasises that the deeper the trade agreement, the more UK regulations and standards must align with those of the EU. To the EU, alignment is essential to preserve a level playing field, on the grounds that the EU and UK are close neighbouring economies and strongly interconnected. The European Commission's 3 February 2020 recommendation for a Council decision authorising the opening of negotiations on the future relationship confirms this approach. In this context, time is critical. The Withdrawal Agreement allows for an extension to the transition period, but the UK Withdrawal Act explicitly prohibits extension. In addition, to allow for ratification, the trade agreement should be ready well ahead of the end of the transition period. The Commission recommendation insists on including fisheries (a highly sensitive area of negotiation), in the new economic partnership and that related provisions should be established by 1 July 2020. Time-constrained negotiation may give rise to a limited economic and trade agreement that covers only priority areas, rather than the ambitious single comprehensive agreement sought under the Political Declaration and Commission recommendation.

Publicado em 19-02-2020

Accords internationaux en marche: Le futur partenariat de l’UE avec les pays d’Afrique, des Caraïbes et du Pacifique (« post-Cotonou »)

19-02-2020

L’accord de partenariat entre l’Union européenne et les pays d’Afrique, des Caraïbes et du Pacifique (ACP) devait expirer en février 2020. La renégociation de cet « Accord de Cotonou » offre l’opportunité de revoir les relations entre les pays ACP et l’Union en tenant compte des objectifs de développement durable des Nations unies, de la redéfinition des stratégies européennes dans les régions concernées, des nouvelles ambitions des pays ACP et de l’évolution de l’équilibre des pouvoirs au niveau ...

L’accord de partenariat entre l’Union européenne et les pays d’Afrique, des Caraïbes et du Pacifique (ACP) devait expirer en février 2020. La renégociation de cet « Accord de Cotonou » offre l’opportunité de revoir les relations entre les pays ACP et l’Union en tenant compte des objectifs de développement durable des Nations unies, de la redéfinition des stratégies européennes dans les régions concernées, des nouvelles ambitions des pays ACP et de l’évolution de l’équilibre des pouvoirs au niveau mondial. Le principal défi pour l’Union européenne est de maintenir ses relations dans les trois sous-régions, tout en restant fidèle aux valeurs promues dans les traités européens. La question du financement est également sur la table. Le groupe ACP et l’Union européenne ont adopté leurs mandats de négociation respectivement en mai et juin 2018 et les négociations ont débuté en septembre 2018. Les parties prenantes se sont accordées sur le principe d’un socle commun complété par trois protocoles régionaux. Ces négociations à plusieurs niveaux ainsi que les discussions en cours sur le futur budget de l’UE ont empêché de finaliser l’accord à temps. Afin d’éviter un vide juridique dans les relations après l’échéance prévue de l’accord de Cotonou, les dispositions de ce dernier ont été prolongées jusqu’au 31 décembre 2020 au plus tard. Quatrième édition. Les Briefings 'Accords internationaux en marche' sont actualisés à des étapes clés de la procédure de ratification. Versions précédentes de ce briefing : PE 625.111, juillet 2018, PE 630.280, novembre 2018, PE 637.981, juillet 2019.

CRR/CRD: The delegated act on Market Risk under CRR and other forthcoming delegated act in banking

19-02-2020

This first ECON scrutiny session continues the ECON’s discussions on CRD/CRR during the previous legislature and covers in particular the delegated act on market risk (C(2019) 9068). In addition, two forthcoming regulatory technical standards (RTS) are discussed, namely the RTS on mapping of derivative transactions on which the EBA has finalised its draft (EBA-RTS-2019-02), and the RTS on criteria to define managerial responsibility and control functions on which the EBA has started a consultation ...

This first ECON scrutiny session continues the ECON’s discussions on CRD/CRR during the previous legislature and covers in particular the delegated act on market risk (C(2019) 9068). In addition, two forthcoming regulatory technical standards (RTS) are discussed, namely the RTS on mapping of derivative transactions on which the EBA has finalised its draft (EBA-RTS-2019-02), and the RTS on criteria to define managerial responsibility and control functions on which the EBA has started a consultation (EBA/CP/2019/16).

Novel Coronavirus Outbreak - State of play with the epidemics; preparedness and response measurers

17-02-2020

Following the extraordinary Council meeting of health ministers on 13 February 2020, this paper summarises the latest available information on the novel coronavirus outbreak, and the Union’s preparedness and response actions. It is an extended and updated version of the “At a Glance” overview, published on 14 February 2020.

Following the extraordinary Council meeting of health ministers on 13 February 2020, this paper summarises the latest available information on the novel coronavirus outbreak, and the Union’s preparedness and response actions. It is an extended and updated version of the “At a Glance” overview, published on 14 February 2020.

The benefits of EU membership are not measured by net operating balances

19-02-2020

National operating budgetary balances (OBBs) do not take into account all of the economic and non-monetary benefits that Member States gain from EU membership. In many policy areas with cross-border characteristics and demand for critical mass, common action at the EU level may lead to better results than fragmented national initiatives. Several studies show that the Single Market has increased employment and growth. The effect of the Single Market deepening since 1990 has been quantified by 3.6 ...

National operating budgetary balances (OBBs) do not take into account all of the economic and non-monetary benefits that Member States gain from EU membership. In many policy areas with cross-border characteristics and demand for critical mass, common action at the EU level may lead to better results than fragmented national initiatives. Several studies show that the Single Market has increased employment and growth. The effect of the Single Market deepening since 1990 has been quantified by 3.6 million new jobs. Additionally, EU GDP would be 8.7% lower if there had been no Single Market integration. The average EU citizen gains €840 more per year thanks to the Single Market. While all EU citizens benefit from income gains thanks to the Single Market, these effects are higher for Western Europeans in absolute terms. Relative to GDP, gains and losses are more similar..

Autor externo

Marta Pilati, Fabian Zuleeg

Why net operating balances are a distorted indicator of a Member State's benefit from the EU budget

19-02-2020

Operating budgetary balance (OBB) calculations imply that EU spending is a zero-sum game. This feature is inconsistent with the main argument that EU spending creates European added value. Thus, taking simple net operating balances as an indicator of a Member State’s ‘net benefit’ from the Union’s fiscal activities can lead to misleading results, as demonstrated in the following points of argument.

Operating budgetary balance (OBB) calculations imply that EU spending is a zero-sum game. This feature is inconsistent with the main argument that EU spending creates European added value. Thus, taking simple net operating balances as an indicator of a Member State’s ‘net benefit’ from the Union’s fiscal activities can lead to misleading results, as demonstrated in the following points of argument.

Autor externo

Zareh Astryan, Annika Havlik, Friedrich heinermann, Justus Nover

The net operating balances: Variants, emerging numbers and history

19-02-2020

Operating budgetary balances (OBBs) are calculated and published annually by the European Commission as an attempt to document the differences between a Member State’s financial contribution to and its allocated expenditure from the EU budget. OBBs have become a highly politicised concept, with substantial shortcomings. Calculating Operating budgetary balances is purely an accounting exercise. This is most convincingly demonstrated by the zero-sum assumption inherent in the Operating budgetary balance ...

Operating budgetary balances (OBBs) are calculated and published annually by the European Commission as an attempt to document the differences between a Member State’s financial contribution to and its allocated expenditure from the EU budget. OBBs have become a highly politicised concept, with substantial shortcomings. Calculating Operating budgetary balances is purely an accounting exercise. This is most convincingly demonstrated by the zero-sum assumption inherent in the Operating budgetary balance concept, as a positive OBB of one country must necessarily be offset by a negative OBB of equal size by another Member State. Evidently, such a perspective stands in sharp contrast with the idea of an EU budget that is not primarily meant as a system of fiscal redistribution, but rather as a means to generate European added value. In addition to the criticisms on the interpretation of Operating budgetary balances, the approach also has serious inherent limitations:.

Autor externo

Zareh Astryan, Annika Havlik, Friedrich heinermann, Justus Nover, Marta Pilati

Strategies to overcome the "juste retour" perspective on the EU budget

19-02-2020

A net budgetary balance is a highly misleading indicator of the benefits from EU spending and EU membership. Budgetary decisions taken on the basis of this indicator result in poor policies as they are biased towards programmes with monetary backflows into Member States. This ‘juste retour’ mentality is a major obstacle to achieving more European added value through the EU budget. The deeper underlying cause of this misleading and detrimental net balance preoccupation is the high salience and political ...

A net budgetary balance is a highly misleading indicator of the benefits from EU spending and EU membership. Budgetary decisions taken on the basis of this indicator result in poor policies as they are biased towards programmes with monetary backflows into Member States. This ‘juste retour’ mentality is a major obstacle to achieving more European added value through the EU budget. The deeper underlying cause of this misleading and detrimental net balance preoccupation is the high salience and political appeal of backflow policies, with their easily identifiable national and regional beneficiaries. Policies whose European benefits are more dispersed and do not entail payments into Member States do receive less voter and policy support. This briefing sketches and discusses the options that might correct this detrimental bias.

Autor externo

Giacomo Benedetto, Friedrich Heinermann, Fabian Zuleeg

Publicado em 18-02-2020

Research for REGI Committee - Briefing: - Assesment of the Just Transition Fund proposal

18-02-2020

Soon after unveiling the overall roadmap for its flagship European Green Deal initiative, the European Commission published its first concrete proposal on 14 January 2020, on how to establish a Just Transition Mechanism (European Commission, 2020a, 2020b and 2020c). The objective of this initiative is to provide support to territories facing serious socio-economic challenges arising from the transition towards climate-neutrality. To reach the €100 billion of Just Transition Mechanism financing (for ...

Soon after unveiling the overall roadmap for its flagship European Green Deal initiative, the European Commission published its first concrete proposal on 14 January 2020, on how to establish a Just Transition Mechanism (European Commission, 2020a, 2020b and 2020c). The objective of this initiative is to provide support to territories facing serious socio-economic challenges arising from the transition towards climate-neutrality. To reach the €100 billion of Just Transition Mechanism financing (for the period 2021-2027) promised by European Commission President Von der Leyen, the initiative relies on three main pillars (European Commission, 2020a): 1. The creation of a Just Transition Fund (JTF): the Commission wants to add €7.5 billion of ‘fresh money’ to the total amount proposed in 2018 for the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). This is supposed to trigger between €30 billion and €50 billion of additional funding for the regions most affected by the transition 2. The use of a portion of the InvestEU financing devoted to climate to mobilise a total of €45 billion of investment in ‘Just Transition’ projects between 2021 and 2027. 3. The creation a public sector loan facility at the European Investment Bank partly guaranteed by the EU budget, to mobilise between €25 billion to €30 billion of additional public investments in 2021-2027.

Autor externo

BRUEGEL - Aliénor Cameron, Grégory Claeys, Catarina Mideos and Simone Tagliapietra

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