Independence with Weak Accountability: The Swiss Case
Poglobljena analiza
29-09-2020
The Swiss National Bank is highly independent but weakly accountable. Weak accountability is rooted in the formal legislation on central banking but also in the reputation of the Bank, which is unanimously considered as highly successful. The ECB too is highly independent and weakly accountable but it faces diverse public opinions whose views differ across countries. Buttressing ECB accountability is important, therefore, and the European Parliament should consider strengthening the Monetary Dialogue. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON).
Poglobljena analiza
Zunanji avtor
Charles WYPLOSZ
O dokumentu
Vrsta publikacije
Ključna beseda
- centralna banka
- delovanje institucij
- denarno poslovanje
- dokumentacija
- ekonomska geografija
- enotna monetarna politika
- Evropa
- Evropska centralna banka
- EVROPSKA UNIJA
- Evropski parlament
- FINANCE
- finančna stabilnost
- GEOGRAFIJA
- gospodarske razmere
- GOSPODARSTVO
- inflacija
- institucije EU in evropska javna uprava
- IZOBRAŽEVANJE IN KOMUNIKACIJE
- javno mnenje
- POLITIKA
- politika in javna varnost
- politična geografija
- politični okvir
- pooblastilo za nadzor
- prost pretok kapitala
- raziskovalno poročilo
- Švica