Independence with Weak Accountability: The Swiss Case
Djupanalys
29-09-2020
The Swiss National Bank is highly independent but weakly accountable. Weak accountability is rooted in the formal legislation on central banking but also in the reputation of the Bank, which is unanimously considered as highly successful. The ECB too is highly independent and weakly accountable but it faces diverse public opinions whose views differ across countries. Buttressing ECB accountability is important, therefore, and the European Parliament should consider strengthening the Monetary Dialogue. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON).
Djupanalys
Extern avdelning
Charles WYPLOSZ
Om detta dokument
Publikationstyp
Sökord
- allmän opinion
- centralbank
- dokumentation
- EKONOMI
- ekonomisk geografi
- ekonomiska läget
- enhetlig monetär politik
- EU-institutionerna och EU:s förvaltning
- Europa
- Europaparlamentet
- Europeiska centralbanken
- EUROPEISKA UNIONEN
- FINANSER
- finansiell stabilitet
- forskningsrapport
- fri rörlighet för kapital
- GEOGRAFI
- inflation
- institutionernas arbetssätt
- kontrollbefogenhet
- penningväsen
- POLITIK
- politik och allmän säkerhet
- politisk geografi
- politisk ram
- Schweiz
- UTBILDNING OCH KOMMUNIKATION