Accountability at the Fed and the ECB
Djupanalys
30-09-2020
This paper reviews the independence and accountability of the ECB and the Federal Reserve. While the ECB makes significant efforts to be accountable for its actions, there are several improvements that could be made to European institutions to improve its independence and accountability. These include reforming the process of appointing ECB Executive Board members, improving the transparency of ECB decision-making and reforming aspects of the Monetary Dialogue to make the questioning more effective. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON).
Djupanalys
Extern avdelning
Karl WHELAN
Om detta dokument
Publikationstyp
Sökord
- Amerika
- dokumentation
- ekonomisk geografi
- EU-institutionerna och EU:s förvaltning
- Europaparlamentet
- Europeiska centralbanken
- Europeiska rådet
- EUROPEISKA UNIONEN
- forskningsrapport
- Förenta staterna
- GEOGRAFI
- insyn i beslutsfattandet
- interinstitutionella kontakter
- kontrollbefogenhet
- POLITIK
- politisk geografi
- politisk ram
- UTBILDNING OCH KOMMUNIKATION
- utnämning av ledamöter