


# EUROOPA PARLAMENT

2004



2009

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*Rahvusvahelise kaubanduse komisjon*

ESIALGNE  
**2005/2247(INI)**

24.1.2006

## **RAPORTI PROJEKT**

Hongkongis toimunud WTO ministrite konverentsi tulemused  
(2005/2247(INI))

Rahvusvahelise kaubanduse komisjon

Raportöör: Georgios Papastamkos

**SISUKORD**

**lehekülg**

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## EUROOPA PARLAMENDI RESOLUTSIOONI ETTEPANEK

### Hongkongis toimunud WTO ministrite konverentsi tulemuste kohta (2005/2247(INI))

*Euroopa Parlament,*

- võttes arvesse Maailma Kaubandusorganisatsiooni (WTO) ministrite konverentsi kuuendal istungjärgul 18. detsembril 2005 vastu võetud deklaratsiooni<sup>1</sup>;
- võttes arvesse 12.–15. detsembri 2005. aasta ja 25.–26. novembri 2004. aasta WTO parlamentaarse konverentsi lõppdeklaratsioone;
- võttes arvesse oma 1. detsembri 2005. aasta resolutsiooni ettevalmistuste kohta WTO kuuendaks ministrite konverentsiks Hongkongis<sup>2</sup>;
- võttes arvesse nõukogu järeldusi WTO Doha arengukava kohta pärast välissuhteid käsitlevat nõukogu erakorralist istungit 18. oktoobril 2005 Luxembourgis (13378/05);
- võttes arvesse oma 12. mai 2005. aasta resolutsiooni Doha vooru hindamise kohta WTO üldnõukogu 1. augusti 2004. aasta otsuse järel<sup>3</sup>;
- võttes arvesse WTO üldnõukogu 1. augusti 2004. aasta otsust<sup>4</sup>;
- võttes arvesse 14. novembril 2001 Dohas vastu võetud WTO ministrite deklaratsiooni<sup>5</sup>;
- võttes arvesse oma 15. detsembri 1999. aasta resolutsiooni WTO III ministrite konverentsi kohta Seattle'is<sup>6</sup>, 13. detsembri 2001. aasta resolutsiooni WTO Katari kohtumise kohta<sup>7</sup> ning 25. septembri 2003. aasta resolutsiooni WTO V ministrite konverentsi kohta Cancúnis<sup>8</sup>;
- võttes arvesse Sutherlandi aruannet "WTO tulevik: institutsioonilistele väljakutsetele vastamine uuel aastatuhandel"<sup>9</sup>,
- võttes arvesse oma 9. märtsi 2005. aasta resolutsiooni ettepaneku kohta võtta vastu nõukogu määrus üldiste tariifsete soodustuste kava kohaldamise kohta<sup>10</sup>;
- võttes arvesse kodukorra artiklit 45;
- võttes arvesse rahvusvahelise kaubanduse komisjoni raportit ja regionaalarengukomisjoni, põllumajanduse ja maaelu arengu komisjoni, tööstuse, teadusuuringute ja energeetikakomisjoni ja majandus- ja rahanduskomisjoni arvamusi (A6-0000/2006),

A. arvestades, et WTO mitmepoolne kaubandussüsteem aitab mitmepoolsete reeglite, eeskirjade ja vaidluste kohtuliku lahendamisega kaasa rahvusvahelise kaubanduse

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<sup>1</sup> Dokumendi number 05-6248, dokumendi tähis WT/MIN(05)/DEC)

<sup>2</sup> Vastuvõetud tekstid, 1.12.2005, P6\_TA(2005)0461.

<sup>3</sup> Vastuvõetud tekstid, 12.5.2005, P6\_TA(2005)0182.

<sup>4</sup> Dokumendi number 04-3297, dokumendi tähis WT/L/579)

<sup>5</sup> Dokumendi number 01-5859, dokumendi tähis WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1)

<sup>6</sup> EÜT C 296, 18.10.2000, lk 121.

<sup>7</sup> EÜT C 177 E, 25.07.2002, lk 290.

<sup>8</sup> ELT C 77 E, 26.03.2004, lk 393.

<sup>9</sup> Konsultatiivkogu aruanne peadirektor Supachai Panitchpakdile, WTO, detsember 2004.

<sup>10</sup> Vastuvõetud tekstid, 9.03.2005, P6\_TA-PROV(2005)0066.

suuremale julgeolekule, läbipaistvusele ja stabiilsusele ning globaliseerumise paremale juhtimisele;

- B. arvestades, et Doha läbirääkimiste voozu edukas lõpetamine, nähes ette tegeliku edasise kaubanduse liberaliseerimise ja rangemad mitmepoolsed eeskirjad, võib osutada tähtsaks teguriks majanduskasvu, arengu ja tööhõive edendamisel kogu maailmas ning aidata tõhusalt kaasa arenguriikide integreerimisele maailmamajandusse;
- C. arvestades, et alates Doha voozu käivitamisest on EL etendanud läbirääkimistel juhtrolli ning esitanud usaldusväärseid ja olulisi pakkumisi läbirääkimiste kõikides valdkondades, kaasa arvatud põllumajandus, samas kui teised tööstusriigid ja arenenud arengumaad ei ole ilmutanud samasugust paindlikkust ega omapoolset panust;
- D. arvestades, et jõupingutused kinni pidada Doha voozu lõpetamise tähtajast 2006. aastal ei tohiks kahjustada eesmärki saavutada ambitsioonikas ja tasakaalustatud tulemus;
- E. arvestades, et Doha voozu peab jõudma läbirääkimiste kõigis valdkondades arengut soodustavate tulemusteni, seda eelkõige vähimarenenud riikide huvides;
- F. arvestades, et kokkuleppele on jõutud põllumajandustoodete eksporditoetuste kaotamise lõpptähtajas, ent võrreldavaid edusamme riiklike toetuste ja turulepääsu valdkondades ei ole saavutatud;
- G. arvestades, et juurdepääs mittepõllumajandustoodete turule tootab olulist kaubanduslikku tulu nii Euroopa Liidule kui ka arenguriikidele, sest märkimisväärse osa nende kaubandusest moodustavad tööstuskaubad ning kaubandust teiste arenguriikidega takistavad kõrged tariifsed tõkked;
- H. arvestades, et teenuste valdkonnas ei ole praegune läbirääkimiste praktika andnud mingeid rahuldavaid tulemusi; arvestades, et ELi taotletav eesmärk on tegelik edasine liberaliseerimine, säilitades WTO liikmete riiklikud poliitilised eesmärgid ja nende õiguse reguleerida avalikke teenuseid;
- I. arvestades, et kaubanduse lihtsustamise ja dumpinguvastaste eeskirjade ning teiste WTO eeskirjade parandamine tuleks kasuks kõigile WTO liikmetele, suurendades õiguskindlust, alandades kaubandustehingute kulutusi ning hoides ära kuritarvitusliku või proteksionistliku kasutuse;
- J. arvestades, et globaliseerumisprotsessi ja WTO rolli esitatakse ja mõistetakse sageli valesti, ning vajalik on parandada aruandekohustust ja läbipaistvust WTOs,
- 1. kinnitab oma tahet mitmepoolseks lähenemiseks kaubanduspoliitikale ning oma toetust WTOle kui globaliseerumise juhtimise tähtsaimale foorumile; juhib tähelepanu sellele, et mitmepoolsete läbirääkimiste luhtumine ning üleminek kahepoolsetele/piirkondlikele kokkulepetele tooks kaasa ühekülgse liberaliseerumisprotsessi ja ebaühtlase arengu, mis oleks eriti kahjulik arenguriikidele;

2. taunib aeglast edasiminekut senistel läbirääkimistel ning vähe ambitsioonikate sihtide seadmist Hongkongi ministrite konverentsiks; väljendab siiski oma rahulolu selle üle, et vähemalt ministrite deklaratsioon sillutab teed edasistele läbirääkimistele võtmevaldkondades;
3. nõuab, et kõigis võtmevaldkondades toimuksid läbirääkimised üheaegselt, kooskõlas arusaamaga ühest kohustusest ning ühesugustest kõrgetest eesmärkidest;
4. kinnitab vajadust respektierida ELi põllumajanduse multifunktsionaalset olemust;
5. tuletab meelde, et ühise põllumajanduspoliitika 2003. aasta reformi raames on EL oluliselt kärpinud kaubandust moonutavaid riiklikke toetusi;
6. rõhutab ELi olulist pakkumist kaotada oma eksporditoetuste süsteem 2013. aastaks ning nõuab teistelt WTO liikmetelt sarnaseid samme ekspordilaenude, riiklike kaubandusettevõtete ja toiduabi vallas;
7. osutab seoses turulepääsuga sellele, et vajalik on piiratud paindlikkus nii tariifide alandamise skeemi kui ka tundlike toodete määratlemise tõttu; viitab arenguriikide võimalusele määratleda ise eritooteid; tervitab sellega seoses eeskirja erinäitajate ühiseks kindlaksmääramiseks;
8. tervitab kokkulepet puuvilla eksporditoetuste kaotamise kohta 2006. aastaks ning tollimaksu- ja kvoodivaba turulepääsu tagamist vähimarenenud riikidele; kahetseb siiski edusammude puudumist riiklike toetuste vallas;
9. taunib seda, et edasiminekut ei ole olnud veinide ja kange alkoholi registri loomisel nii nagu ka geograafiliste tähiste kaitse laiendamisel teistele toodetele; tuletab meelde, et läbirääkimiste tasakaalustatud tulemus oleneb ka nendest punktidest;
10. nõuab mittepõllumajandustoodete turulepääsu üle peetavatel läbirääkimistel ambitsioonikate tulemuste saavutamist, mis kehtivate maksumäärade oluliste kärpete kaudu tagaksid uusi reaalseid turulepääsuvõimalusi, kaasa arvatud arengumaade omavahelises kaubanduses; kutsub arenenud arenguriike üles jagama vastutust, väites siiski, et tulemus peaks kajastama kokkulepitud mittetäieliku vastastikkuse põhimõtet;
11. tervitab kokkulepet kasutada Šveitsi skeemi tariifide vähendamiseks; rõhutab siiski, et sellise skeemi ühtlustavat mõju ei tohiks nõrgendada koefitsientide määramisega; pooldab valdkondlikke algatuste jätkamist Euroopa Liidule ekspordi seisukohalt huvipakkuvates valdkondades;
12. märgib, et ka õigustamatute mittetariifsete tõkete kõrvaldamine kõigi kaubanduspartnerite poolt on strateegilise tähtsusega;
13. taunib edusammude puudumist teenuste valdkonnas ja nõuab läbirääkimiste intensiivistamist, võttes nõuetekohaselt arvesse nõrkade ja haavatavate majanduste huvisid; kahetseb asjaolu, et lõppdeklaratsioon ei sea mingeid kvantitatiivseid eesmärke muudetud pakkumiste esitamiseks; kinnitab, et tervishoiu-, haridus- ja audiovisuaalsed teenused ei peaks kuuluma liberaliseerimise alla;

14. kinnitab, et läbirääkimiste edukas lõpetamine peab kaasa tooma eriti vähimarenenud riikide huvides kohustuse konkreetseteks arengueelisteks kõigis läbirääkimiste valdkondades ning aitama kaasa aastatuhande arengueesmärkide saavutamisele;
15. tervitab kokkulepet, mis tagab vähimarenenud riikidele tollimaksu- ja kvoodivaba turulepääsu; kahetseb siiski, et alles on jäänud võimalus säilitada piirangud toodetele, mis on vähimarenenud riikidele võtmetähtsusega, ning et sellise kohustuse järgimine arenenud arenguriikide suhtes jääb vabatahtlikuks; kutsub kõiki tööstusriike ja arenenud arengumaid üles järgima ELi algatuse "Kõik peale relvade" eeskujul;
16. on seisukohal, et kuigi eri- ja diferentseeritud kohtlemine peab moodustama WTO kokkulepete lahutamatu osa, tuleb edasine järkjärguline turgude avanemine arengumaade omavahelises kaubanduses ja rangemate mitmepoolsete eeskirjade kohustus kasuks arengumaade majanduslikule arengule ja nende integreerimisele maailmamajandusse;
17. rõhutab asjakohase tehnilise abi olulisust, et aidata arenguriikidel täita uusi kohustusi, kohaneda reformidega ja tõhusalt rakendada WTO eeskirju; rõhutab samuti vajadust julgustada nõrku ja haavatavaid majandusi integreerima kaubandust oma riiklikusse arengupoliitikasse ja vaesuse vähendamise strateegiasse; toetab algatuse "*Aid for Trade*" laiendamist arenguriikidele eesmärgiga suurendada nende kaubanduse ja ekspordi mahtu, mitmekesistada nende tootmisbaase ning asendada tollimaksust laekuvad vahendid teiste maksutuludega;
18. tervitab seniseid edusamme läbirääkimistel kaubanduse lihtsustamise üle; nõuab mitmepoolsete kohustuste kehtestamist suurema õiguskindluse ning kaubandusprotseduuride lihtsustamise ja kaasajastamise tarvis; rõhutab eesmärgipärase tehnilise abi erilist tähtsust selles valdkonnas;
19. rõhutab, kui tähtis on suurendada avalikku ja poliitilist toetust WTO mitmepoolsele kaubandussüsteemile; rõhutab, et vajalik on avalikkuse parem teavitamine ja laiem arutelu kodanikuühiskonnaga; kinnitab sellega seoses parlamentaarse mõõtme olulist panust demokraatliku kontrolli tugevdamiseks ja avatuseks kodanikele;
20. on valmis oma liikmete erinevate kontaktide kaudu, mis neil on parlamendisaadikutega maadest, kellega EL jagab ühiseid huvisid, aitama positiivselt kaasa läbirääkimiste protsessile;
21. tuletab meelde, kui oluline see on, et komisjon teavitaks igakülgselt Euroopa Parlamenti ning konsulteeriks parlamendiga küsimustes, mis puudutavad läbirääkimiste käiku ja ELi strateegiat pärast Hongkongi konverentsi;
22. teeb presidendile ülesandeks edastada käesolev resolutsioon nõukogule ja komisjonile, liikmesriikide, ühinevate riikide ja kandidaatriikide parlamentidele, WTO peadirektorile ja Parlamentidevahelise Liidu presidendile.

## EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

*Ηράκλειτος [έφη] "το αντίζουν συμφέρον και εκ των διαφερόντων καλλίστην αρμονίαν και πάντα κατ' έριν γίνεσθαι"*

Αριστοτέλης, Ηθικά Νικομάχεια, Θ2.1155 β 5

*Heracleitus [said] that "it is what opposes that helps and from different tones comes the fairest tune and all things are produced through strife"*

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 8I

### **1. The Hong Kong Ministerial Conference: limited expectations - modest results**

The aim of this own-initiative report is to provide an assessment of the Doha Round following the 6th WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong (13-18 December 2005).

The current round of multilateral trade negotiations has been going on since November 2001 and, given the collective ambition to conclude this round before the end of 2006, it has now entered its final phase.

The previous phases of the negotiations - from Doha to Hong Kong via Cancún and Geneva - have revealed wide differences in the expectations, approaches and strategies of the main participants, and highlighted the difficulties involved in trying to reach an ambitious and balanced outcome covering all negotiating areas. As a result, progress has often proven elusive, many intermediate deadlines have been missed and negotiations have not been brought as much forward as one could have hoped and expected.

Because of the complete failure of the 5th Ministerial Conference in Cancún in September 2003 and the sketchy character of the Framework adopted by the WTO General Council in August 2004, the initial objective of the Hong Kong meeting was to consolidate the latter and to achieve a breakthrough by defining modalities in a number of key negotiating areas, such as agriculture, non-agricultural market access and services, and to agree on a significant development package, while encouraging progress in other chapters of the negotiations. Due to a persistent stalemate on the key issue of agricultural market access and a lack of flexibility on the part of other major players, however, the level of ambition for this event had to be eventually scaled down and it became clear, even before the Ministerial Conference started, that only modest results could be achieved.

Parliamentary monitoring of the Hong Kong negotiations - the European Parliament being represented in Hong Kong by a delegation of MEPs - led to the adoption of a joint declaration by the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the European Parliament on 15 December 2005.

Although this contribution was undoubtedly positive, the current arrangements still fall short, in qualitative terms, of a proper forum to ensure WTO democratic accountability and openness. The European Parliament delegation was assisted by the information provided by the Commission and the United Kingdom Presidency regarding the EU negotiating strategy and the general progress achieved in the negotiations before and during the Hong Kong Conference.

The present report comments upon the limited results achieved in Hong Kong. It also draws attention to the considerable work that remains to be done, contains a message of support to

the EU negotiators and is intended to focus attention in view of the next phases of the negotiations.

## **2. Results of the Conference by Subject**

This section is based on the text of the Ministerial Declaration, with special reference to EU negotiating positions.

### **2.1 Agriculture**

The question of agricultural products was designated by a number of developing and developed countries as crucial to the negotiations as a whole, placing the EU and the US in particular on the defensive. It was therefore necessary to break this deadlock if negotiations in other areas were to make any progress. The Hong Kong Conference made a valuable contribution on certain aspects of this dossier as indicated below:

- Agreement was reached on the definitive elimination of all forms of export subsidies by 2013, the year in which current CAP arrangements are due to end. In order to ensure parallelism between export refunds and other forms of export subsidies, such as export credits, exporting state trading enterprises and food aid, however, this date will only be confirmed upon completion of appropriate disciplines on these practices. Other issues, such as the substantial subsidy cuts to be made before 2013, also remain to be settled.
- Regarding domestic support, there was agreement on the fixing of three bands for reductions and on greater linear cuts in the higher levels of support (higher bands). There also appears to be some convergence concerning cuts to be made in Final Bound Total Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS), the overall cut in trade-distorting domestic support, and the *de minimis* limits. A review of the Green Box criteria was also agreed.
- On the difficult issue of market access, i.e. the reduction of agricultural tariffs, no substantive progress was made. There appears to be agreement on the adoption of four bands for structuring tariff cuts, but not on the limits of those bands, the magnitude of the cuts, and other issues such as the selection and special treatment of sensitive products, the operation of the Special Safeguard Mechanism, etc.
- Reference was made to the continuation of work in relation to geographical indications (establishment of a register for wines and spirits and extension of GI protection to other products), but no progress has been recorded on this issue of crucial importance for the EU.
- On the specific subject of cotton, it was agreed that export subsidies would be eliminated by developed countries in 2006, and that these countries would give duty and quota free access for cotton exports from LDCs from the commencement of the implementation period. However, no progress was made on the important issue of domestic support.

### **2.2 Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA)**

The limited progress made in the agricultural negotiations helped to satisfy, to a certain



extent, the demand of the EU and other developed countries for the acceptance of a progressive reduction in tariffs, leading to the adoption of a 'Swiss Formula' for the elimination or reduction of tariffs. There was also agreement on special treatment for developing countries, including asymmetrical reciprocity arrangements regarding tariff reductions.

While acceptance of the Swiss Formula is a particularly significant development, difficult decisions will have to be reached by 30 April 2006 regarding the magnitude of the tariff reductions (through the adoption of coefficients) and the establishment of base rates for commencing such reductions. The Declaration also encourages members to submit proposals aimed at addressing the issue of non-tariff barriers (NTBs).

### **2.3 Services**

On the subject of services, reference was simply made to progress achieved from the establishment of the GATS to the agreement of August 2004. A statement was also issued by members concerning the intensification of the relevant negotiations in accordance with Annex C to the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration. The Conference failed to make any substantial headway regarding the further liberalisation of international trade in services, which means that spectacular progress must now be made, both on a plurilateral and bilateral basis, if the objectives of the Doha Round are to be achieved. For the EU, progress in this sector is of vital importance to the development of its economy and to employment.

### **2.4 Trade and Development**

Regarding support for developing countries and their smoother integration into the global economy, a number of decisions were taken, such as:

- The abolition, by 2008 or no later than the start of the implementation period, of tariff and quantitative restrictions for exports from the LDCs. However, this concession will only be given by developed countries and developing countries "declaring themselves in a position to do so" and restrictions may be maintained for up to 3 percent of tariff lines. The Ministerial Declaration also refers to measures to facilitate transactions and simplify rules of origin, increase technical support, encourage the creation of institutions, etc.
- The more active involvement of the WTO in efforts by international organisations and individual countries to implement 'Aid for Trade' arrangements enabling the LDCs to reinforce their production and export capacity and requisite commercial infrastructure.
- The reappraisal and further enhancement of the WTO's strategy for the provision of Technical Assistance and Training Plans to developing countries.

### **2.5 Other Business**

On all other matters (e.g. WTO rules, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), environment, trade facilitation, implementation of existing agreements, small economies, trade and transfer of technology, e-commerce, cooperation with other international organisations, etc.), the Hong Kong Conference did not, essentially, add anything new, but merely reconfirmed the *acquis* and called on participating members to continue and step up the negotiations.

### **3. Overall Assessment**

Considered as a whole, the outcome of the Hong Kong Conference may, under the circumstances, be regarded as positive, although the actual results were modest, given the absence of any creative breakthroughs on many crucial issues. A package of development measures was agreed upon and, even more importantly, members reiterated their commitment to a successful conclusion of the round by the end of 2006 and set a number of intermediate deadlines to achieve this objective.

The EU once again made a major contribution to this positive result by accepting a conditional commitment to 2013 as the end-date for the elimination of export subsidies. It is not clear, however, that much has been obtained in return for this concession, whether in other chapters of the agriculture negotiations or in other key areas.

Major advanced developing countries continue to reject the EU proposal on agricultural market access, despite the considerable sacrifices this proposal entails for our rural communities, and they have thus far refused to make any meaningful concessions in NAMA and services. This attitude is all the more worrying if one considers that these countries are those which maintain the highest levels of protection and hold the key to the development of poorer countries through the promotion of South-South trade.

Although development concerns should and will continue to remain at the heart of these negotiations, they should not be confused with the single-sided advancement of the interests of large agricultural exporters nor be allowed to serve as a cover for protectionism.

The EU has, along the different phases of the negotiations, exercised leadership in the adoption of measures in favour of the poorest members, such as those concerning access to medicines, duty-free quota-free access to markets for LDCs and cotton. Although other members have also accepted commitments on these issues before and during the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, these commitments are not as far reaching (duty-free quota-free access, cotton) or at the same advanced stage of implementation (access to medicines) as in the case of the EU.

The EU has also, alongside other developed country members, launched the idea of a "round for free" in favour of the poorest members which, as a result of all these initiatives, stand to obtain a lot, including in the form of increased aid for trade, and are expected to give little.

Further unilateral EU concessions in agriculture at this stage would clearly jeopardise the implementation of our reformed CAP and be of no or little benefit to those countries for which the development agenda has been designed.

It is time therefore that the attention of negotiators start shifting to other important areas of the negotiations, such as NAMA, services, but also trade facilitation and rules issues, with a view to defining modalities and disciplines which really make a difference in international trade.

This would be in the interest of the EU, whose participation in the Doha Round should remain consistent with the objectives of enhanced growth, employment and competitiveness laid out in its Lisbon Strategy. It would also be in the interest of those many developing countries which enjoy actual or potential comparative advantages in industrial or services sectors and for which an "agriculture only" round would represent a major loss of opportunities.

### **4. Beyond Hong Kong**

The Hong Kong Conference showed that the road to a successful conclusion of the current round remains open. However, this road is a bumpy one and may soon hit a dead end.

The political will seems to be there but positions still widely differ and the almost exclusive focus of the negotiations on agriculture thus far has not allowed the trade-offs across issues to materialise, which are so crucial at such an advanced stage.

Whether the very tight deadlines defined in Hong Kong can be met remains to be seen.

As WTO members engage into the last and most difficult phases of the negotiations, it would probably be useful to replace this whole process into a general perspective.

There should be an awareness on all sides that there is no viable alternative to the multilateral trading system when it comes to ensuring economic integration and development, the effective management of increased economic interdependency and the peaceful and fair settlement of disputes. The successful conclusion of the Doha Round would strengthen and widen international trade and development, making the international trading system fairer and more effective for the benefit of all members. Moreover, it would act as a barrier to the spread of protectionism. Likewise, in an age where demand for international institutions and for the management of world politics outstrips supply, the success of the Doha Round could provide a significant impetus to international cooperation and integration as a whole.

While there is some room in the WTO for considerations related to the development of the poor countries of the South, environmental protection and social responsibility, it should be borne in mind that the WTO is not purely a development body and much less an environment or social-policy organisation. It is in fact a specialised organisation with specific terms of reference regarding international trade. Overloading its agenda with matters beyond the confines of 'trade-related issues' and overemphasising them in the Doha Declaration has made the negotiations even more difficult. These difficulties tend to be exacerbated by a lack of democracy in the WTO's relations with civil society and insufficient efforts of communication and information.

Moreover, the direction taken by negotiations so far, set against the increasingly heterogeneous composition of the WTO, has shown that moves to regulate those areas of its members' domestic economic policies which have a trade-policy dimension meet with resistance, causing negotiations to become bogged down and resulting in persistent breakdowns in communication.

During the pre-Hong Kong negotiations, and at the conference itself, the EU has continued to promote a comprehensive vision of the Doha round, seeking at the same time a further liberalisation of international trade in goods and services and the strengthening of multilateral trade rules and disciplines, while encouraging and supporting the development efforts of the world's poorest countries. Thanks to the indefatigable efforts of the Commission's team of able negotiators, the unity of its Member States, and the support of the European Parliament, the EU was able to submit important, credible and constructive proposals on all the subjects covered by the Hong Kong negotiations. The EU will certainly continue its efforts during the months to come and should become even more actively involved in efforts to ensure the successful conclusion of the Round.

The EU's negotiating springboard and objective reference framework is provided by the regulatory *acquis* of its internal market. The cognitive projection of the European governance model – based on the characteristics of normative power – at the larger scale of world trade

governance runs contrary to the less regulatory and less binding WTO system. The more stable and comprehensive the WTO regulatory system becomes, the greater the resulting global convergence, and the closer the multilateral trading system will come to the European model of external action.