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Review of dual-use export controls

26-11-2019

Certain goods and technologies have legitimate civilian applications but can also be used for military purposes; so-called 'dual-use' goods are subject to the European Union's export control regime. The regime is now being revised, mainly to take account of significant technological developments and to create a more level playing field among EU Member States. The proposed regulation would recast the regulation in force since 2009. Among other elements, the proposal seeks to introduce an 'autonomous ...

Certain goods and technologies have legitimate civilian applications but can also be used for military purposes; so-called 'dual-use' goods are subject to the European Union's export control regime. The regime is now being revised, mainly to take account of significant technological developments and to create a more level playing field among EU Member States. The proposed regulation would recast the regulation in force since 2009. Among other elements, the proposal seeks to introduce an 'autonomous' EU list for cyber-surveillance technology featuring items that are not (yet) subject to multilateral export control. Moreover, the proposal seeks to introduce human rights violations as an explicit justification for export control. Stakeholders are divided over the incorporation of human rights considerations, with the technology industry particularly concerned that it might lose out to non-European competitors. On 17 January 2018, based on the INTA committee's report on the legislative proposal, the European Parliament adopted its position for trilogue negotiations. For its part, the Council adopted its negotiating mandate on 5 June 2019, and on the basis of this mandate, the Council Presidency began negotiations with the European Parliament's delegation on 21 October 2019. Fifth edition. The ‘EU Legislation in Progress’ briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure. Please note this document has been designed for on-line viewing.

The migration, borders and security cluster of the 2021-2027 MFF

07-12-2018

Within the context of the multiannual financial framework the Commission is proposing a cluster of four instruments under three funds to deal with migration borders and security. This initial appraisal of the Commission’s impact assessment on the proposals acknowledges the necessity for impact assessments in relation to financial framework programmes to have a simplified format and scope differing from standard impact assessments and that the document in question sets out the rationale for the new ...

Within the context of the multiannual financial framework the Commission is proposing a cluster of four instruments under three funds to deal with migration borders and security. This initial appraisal of the Commission’s impact assessment on the proposals acknowledges the necessity for impact assessments in relation to financial framework programmes to have a simplified format and scope differing from standard impact assessments and that the document in question sets out the rationale for the new instruments and explains the choices made in their design. It finds however that the level of analysis conducted and the measure of the departure from the standard methodology and format of impact assessments weaken its potential to inform decision-making.

Defence: What has the EU done?

29-06-2018

Attempts to move towards a common defence have been part of the European Project since its inception. However, more has been achieved in the past two years than in the last 60 years.

Attempts to move towards a common defence have been part of the European Project since its inception. However, more has been achieved in the past two years than in the last 60 years.

Defence: Member States' Spending

31-05-2018

In 2016, the amount of expenditure dedicated to defence represented 1.3% of GDP for the EU-28 and 1.2% of GDP for the Euro area. This is much less than the amount spent on social protection (which is equivalent to 19.1% of GDP), Health (7.1%) or Education (4.7%) but not quite as much as the amount spent on Public Safety and Order (1.7% of GDP) and significantly higher that the amount spent on environmental protection (0.7% of GDP). In 2016, the highest levels of expenditure in defence in the EU were ...

In 2016, the amount of expenditure dedicated to defence represented 1.3% of GDP for the EU-28 and 1.2% of GDP for the Euro area. This is much less than the amount spent on social protection (which is equivalent to 19.1% of GDP), Health (7.1%) or Education (4.7%) but not quite as much as the amount spent on Public Safety and Order (1.7% of GDP) and significantly higher that the amount spent on environmental protection (0.7% of GDP). In 2016, the highest levels of expenditure in defence in the EU were observed in Estonia (2.4% of GDP), followed by Greece (2.1% of GDP), the United-Kingdom (2.0% of GDP) and France (1.8% of GDP). As a share of total government expenditure, defence expenditure amounted to 2.9% in the EU and to 2.6% in the Euro area.

Perspectives on transatlantic cooperation: Transatlantic cyber-insecurity and cybercrime - Economic impact and future prospects

07-12-2017

Over the past two decades, an ‘open’ internet and the spread of digital technologies have brought great economic benefits on both sides of the Atlantic. At the same time, the spread of insecure digital technologies has also enabled costly new forms of crime, and created systemic risks to transatlantic and national critical infrastructure, threatening economic growth and development. The transnational nature of these phenomena make it very difficult for effective policy solutions to be implemented ...

Over the past two decades, an ‘open’ internet and the spread of digital technologies have brought great economic benefits on both sides of the Atlantic. At the same time, the spread of insecure digital technologies has also enabled costly new forms of crime, and created systemic risks to transatlantic and national critical infrastructure, threatening economic growth and development. The transnational nature of these phenomena make it very difficult for effective policy solutions to be implemented unilaterally by any one jurisdiction. Cooperation between stakeholders in both the EU and US is required in the development and implementation of policies to increase the security of digital technologies and increase societal resilience to the cybersecurity risks associated with critical infrastructure. Although there is a great deal of congruence between the stated policy goals in both the EU and US, obstacles to effective cooperation impede effective transatlantic policy development and implementation in some areas. This study examines the scale of economic and societal benefits, costs, and losses associated with digital technologies. It provides an overview of the key cybercrime, cybersecurity and cyber-resilience issues that policy-makers on either side of the Atlantic could work together on, and explains where effective cooperation is sometimes impeded.

Externe Autor

Benjamin C. Dean, Iconoclast Tech Foreword by Patryk Pawlak, formerly of EPRS, now of EU Institute for Security Studies Administrator responsible: Elena Lazarou, Members' Research Service, EPRS

Sakharov Prize Finalists 2017

04-12-2017

Short presentation of two Sakharov Prize Finalists 2017.

Short presentation of two Sakharov Prize Finalists 2017.

EU summer-time arrangements under Directive 2000/84/EC: Ex-post Impact Assessment

25-10-2017

The purpose of summer time is to capitalise on natural daylight. By turning the clock one hour forward as the days get longer in spring, sunset is delayed by this same hour, until the clock is set back again in autumn. This practice is applied in over 60 countries worldwide. In the EU, Member States draw on a long tradition of daylight saving time (DST), and many have developed their own DST schemes. Harmonisation attempts began in the 1970s, to facilitate the effective operation of the internal ...

The purpose of summer time is to capitalise on natural daylight. By turning the clock one hour forward as the days get longer in spring, sunset is delayed by this same hour, until the clock is set back again in autumn. This practice is applied in over 60 countries worldwide. In the EU, Member States draw on a long tradition of daylight saving time (DST), and many have developed their own DST schemes. Harmonisation attempts began in the 1970s, to facilitate the effective operation of the internal market. Today, the uniform EU-wide application of DST is governed by Directive 2000/84/EC; most European third countries have aligned their summer-time schemes with that of the EU. Much academic research has been invested in examining the benefits and inconveniences of DST. It appears that: - summer time benefits the internal market (notably the transport sector) and outdoor leisure activities, and it also generates marginal savings in energy consumption; - the impact on other economic sectors remains largely inconclusive; - with regard to inconveniences, health research associates DST with disruption to the human biorhythm ('circadian rhythm').

Digitising Industry (Industry 4.0) and Cybersecurity

18-10-2017

The digitalisation of manufacturing industry, i.e. employing in depth digital technologies for the performance of good production raises additional cybersecurity questions. Currently EU cybersecurity policies are mainly targeting network security and large infrastructures of public interest, with little emphasis on the needs of a digitised industry. Still, recent policy developments do provide framework of possibly covering these needs.

The digitalisation of manufacturing industry, i.e. employing in depth digital technologies for the performance of good production raises additional cybersecurity questions. Currently EU cybersecurity policies are mainly targeting network security and large infrastructures of public interest, with little emphasis on the needs of a digitised industry. Still, recent policy developments do provide framework of possibly covering these needs.

Control of the acquisition and possession of weapons

23-06-2017

In the aftermath of the Paris terrorist attacks, in November 2015 the European Commission presented a package of measures aiming to tighten control on the acquisition and possession of firearms in the European Union, improve traceability of legally held firearms and enhance cooperation between Member States, as well as ensure that deactivated firearms are rendered inoperable. The proposal to amend the current 'Firearms Directive' (Directive 91/477/EEC) was part of this package. It aimed to ban some ...

In the aftermath of the Paris terrorist attacks, in November 2015 the European Commission presented a package of measures aiming to tighten control on the acquisition and possession of firearms in the European Union, improve traceability of legally held firearms and enhance cooperation between Member States, as well as ensure that deactivated firearms are rendered inoperable. The proposal to amend the current 'Firearms Directive' (Directive 91/477/EEC) was part of this package. It aimed to ban some semi-automatic firearms for civilian use, as well as to include some previously excluded actors (collectors and brokers) and blank-firing weapons within the scope of the Directive. Parliament and Council reached agreement on the proposal in December, and formally adopted it in March and April respectively. The new directive reduces the number of weapons categories and changes the classification of certain types of weapons, while strictly defining exceptions for civilian use of the most dangerous weapons. It entered into force on 13 June 2017, with the deadline for transposition of most provisions set at 14 September 2018. This updates a briefing of January 2017, drafted by Jana Valant: PE 595.875.

Countering hybrid threats: EU-NATO cooperation

02-03-2017

The concept of hybrid threat has gained traction in relation to Russia’s actions in Ukraine and the ISIL/Da’esh campaigns going far beyond Syria and Iraq. Faced with this constantly evolving challenge, the European Union and NATO have taken several steps to strengthen their respective capabilities and pursue common objectives through closer cooperation. The EU-NATO joint declaration adopted in July 2016 in the margins of the Warsaw NATO Summit represents a clear step forward in this regard. The document ...

The concept of hybrid threat has gained traction in relation to Russia’s actions in Ukraine and the ISIL/Da’esh campaigns going far beyond Syria and Iraq. Faced with this constantly evolving challenge, the European Union and NATO have taken several steps to strengthen their respective capabilities and pursue common objectives through closer cooperation. The EU-NATO joint declaration adopted in July 2016 in the margins of the Warsaw NATO Summit represents a clear step forward in this regard. The document outlines new areas for practical cooperation, in particular with regard to hybrid threats, building resilience in cybersecurity, and strategic communications. The Council conclusions of 6 December 2016 stressed that the implementation of the joint declaration is a key political priority for the EU. It welcomed the progress achieved in advancing EU-NATO relations, including implementing and operationalising parallel procedures and playbooks for interaction in countering hybrid threats. With a view to ensuring further progress, the Council endorsed a common set of proposals focused on better coordination, situational awareness, strategic communication, crisis response, and bolstering resilience. The North Atlantic Council endorsed the same set of measures. Reports on implementation, including possible suggestions for future cooperation, should be provided on a biannual basis from the end of June 2017. This is an updated edition of an At a Glance note published in June 2015.

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