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This document presents the main features of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), including governance, capital structure and funding sources, main lending instruments, as well as its oversight and accountability framework. It also reviews recent proposals and contributions on the possible evolution of the ESM. This note is regularly updated.

This note is mainly based on documents published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) on 7 December 2017 under the header Finalising Basel III post-crisis reforms, namely the High-level summary of Basel III reforms and the full text of the reforms. EGOV has previously published a briefing specifically on the role of the BCBS.

This note provides a summary of 4 expert papers assessing the role of precautionary recapitalisation in the Banking Union.

Since 1 January 2016 it is mandatory under the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) to bail-in shareholders and creditors for a minimum amount of 8% of total liabilities before any funds from the Single Resolution Fund may be injected into a bank under resolution. A number of national competent authorities therefore triggered the resolution of weak banks before the deadline of 31 December 2015. However, since 2013 EU State aid rules have imposed (the "2013 Banking Communication") that subordinated ...

Bail-in can potentially lead to enhanced market discipline and lower use of public finances only if its application is credible and stringent. This requires that the holders of bail-in able debt have the capacity of absorbing losses but also that the application of bail-in does is consistent with financial stability. Sophisticated investors have typically a larger financial capacity than unsophisticated investors but they are also more reactive to information and/or imposition of losses and are therefore ...

An important prerequisite for the efficiency of bail-in as a regulatory tool is that debt holders are able to bear the cost of a bail-in. Examining European banks’ subordinated debt we caution that households may be investors in bail-in able bonds. Since households do not fulfil the aforementioned prerequisite, we argue that European bank supervisors need to ensure that banks’ bail-in bonds are held by sophisticated investors. Existing EU market regulation insufficiently addresses mis-selling of ...

Since 1 January 2016 it has become mandatory under the BRRD to bail-in shareholders and creditors for a minimum amount of 8% of total liabilities before any SRF fund be injected into banks under resolution.

The 2014 Comprehensive Assessment by the ECB identified and made public capital shortfalls at 25 major European banks. The banks concerned were required to submit a capital plan to the ECB and the national Competent detailing how the capital shortfall would be filled. Capital plans were to be implemented within six resp. nine months after 26 October 2014. Now that this time has passed, we examine the progress made by the banks required to take action. We also evaluate how far the Comprehensive Assessment ...

On 26 October 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) published the results of the comprehensive assessment that comprised both an asset quality review (AQR) as well as a stress test. Banks that have shown capital shortfalls after the assessment had up to 9 months the close the capital gap. In this paper, we investigate whether actions taken by banks have resulted in noticeable reactions in capital markets. Evidence suggests that banks with shortfalls made some progress during the months after the ...

Compilation of briefing papers analyzing "Banking Rescue Measures" in EU Member States by ECON's panel of financial services experts.