60

result(s)

Word(s)
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Policy area
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Keyword
Date

Review of the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR): Updated rules on supervision of central counterparties (CCPs)

10-01-2020

The increasing importance of central counterparties (CCPs), and challenges such as the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the EU, call for a more comprehensive supervision of CCPs in EU and non-EU countries to secure financial market infrastructure and build confidence. In June 2017, the Commission proposed amendments to Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 (ESMA – European Securities and Markets Authority) and Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (EMIR – European Market Infrastructure), to strengthen the regulatory ...

The increasing importance of central counterparties (CCPs), and challenges such as the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the EU, call for a more comprehensive supervision of CCPs in EU and non-EU countries to secure financial market infrastructure and build confidence. In June 2017, the Commission proposed amendments to Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 (ESMA – European Securities and Markets Authority) and Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (EMIR – European Market Infrastructure), to strengthen the regulatory framework. Under the proposals, EU CCPs would be supervised by national authorities in agreement with ESMA, and third-country CCPs subject to different requirements depending on whether (or not) they are systemically important. Following trilogue negotiations, Parliament voted on the resulting agreement at its plenary session of 18 April 2019. The final act was signed on 23 October 2019 and entered into force on 1 January 2020. Third edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Amending the bank resolution framework – BRRD and SRMR

28-06-2019

In May 2019, the European Parliament and the Council adopted the proposals amending the EU legislative framework on bank resolution, consisting of the Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive, and the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation. Resolution is the restructuring of a bank which is failing or likely to fail, aiming at safeguarding continuity of the bank's critical functions, preserving financial stability and minimising rescue costs to taxpayers. The adopted amendments incorporate into ...

In May 2019, the European Parliament and the Council adopted the proposals amending the EU legislative framework on bank resolution, consisting of the Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive, and the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation. Resolution is the restructuring of a bank which is failing or likely to fail, aiming at safeguarding continuity of the bank's critical functions, preserving financial stability and minimising rescue costs to taxpayers. The adopted amendments incorporate into EU law the Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity standard, set at international level to improve large financial institutions' capacity to absorb losses and recapitalise in case they are placed in resolution. The new legislative texts were published in the Official Journal on 7 June 2019, and come fully into force on 28 December 2020.

Cost of non-Europe in robotics and artificial intelligence

12-06-2019

Robotics is a wide and multi-faceted domain, which crosses boundaries between many economics sectors and legal disciplines. The perception of a need for some kind of Europe-wide legal framework to accompany the development of robotic and artificial intelligence (AI) technologies is growing. A harmonised EU regulatory framework concerning specifically liability and insurance regarding robotics and AI could provide greater legal certainty and promote trust. It could also stimulate greater research ...

Robotics is a wide and multi-faceted domain, which crosses boundaries between many economics sectors and legal disciplines. The perception of a need for some kind of Europe-wide legal framework to accompany the development of robotic and artificial intelligence (AI) technologies is growing. A harmonised EU regulatory framework concerning specifically liability and insurance regarding robotics and AI could provide greater legal certainty and promote trust. It could also stimulate greater research and development activity by producers and increase the speed of uptake of these two new emerging technologies by consumers, resulting in a possible positive impact in terms of GDP. Research suggests that, by 2030, EU GDP could be 0.04 % higher than it would otherwise be under the current regulatory framework.

External author

This study has been written by Bob Martens and Jorren Garrez of DLA Piper UK LLP and Cambridge Econometrics at the request of the European Added Value Unit within the Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services (EPRS) of the European Parliament.

Artificial Intelligence and civil law; liability rules for drones

13-12-2018

This study – commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the JURI Committee – analyses existing European and national legislation on the regulation of drones for civil use, discussing how they are defined and classified, whether certification and registration is required, how liability is apportioned between the subjects involved, and if compulsory insurance is provided for. Finally, on the basis of a risk-management ...

This study – commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the JURI Committee – analyses existing European and national legislation on the regulation of drones for civil use, discussing how they are defined and classified, whether certification and registration is required, how liability is apportioned between the subjects involved, and if compulsory insurance is provided for. Finally, on the basis of a risk-management approach, the study elaborates recommendations for future policy formulation.

External author

Andrea Bertolini

Financing bank resolution: An alternative solution for arranging the liquidity required

21-11-2018

Liquidity in resolution is one of the unresolved elements of the Single Resolution Mechanism. Currently, with the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and the Eurosystem, there are two potential sources of liquidity in resolution, which both have clear limitations in use and amounts. Straightforward solutions to give the SRF and/or Eurosystem more firepower in resolution go against the main objectives of the resolution mechanism (i.e. breaking the sovereign-bank nexus and avoiding use of taxpayers’ money ...

Liquidity in resolution is one of the unresolved elements of the Single Resolution Mechanism. Currently, with the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and the Eurosystem, there are two potential sources of liquidity in resolution, which both have clear limitations in use and amounts. Straightforward solutions to give the SRF and/or Eurosystem more firepower in resolution go against the main objectives of the resolution mechanism (i.e. breaking the sovereign-bank nexus and avoiding use of taxpayers’ money). This paper proposes an ECB liquidity facility with an SRF-guarantee as an alternative solution for banks in resolution. The funds available should be broadly sufficient to address potential liquidity needs for resolution tools. The proposed solution primarily requires agreement on the ESM-backstop for the SRF, a firmer commitment for (possible) future contributions for the SRF as well as a change to the current emergency liquidity assistance or introduction of a new dedicated Transitional Liquidity Assistance by the Eurosystem.

External author

W.P. De Groen, CEPS

The financing of bank resolution - who should provide the required liquidity?

14-11-2018

This paper addresses two distinct yet interconnected problems. The first is whether the provision of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) on an individual bank basis should be centralised within the European Central Bank (ECB) and the second is whether existing liquidity financing arrangements are fit for the role. The paper argues that ELA centralisation would not require Treaty amendment and that a liquidity backstop is needed. However the latter cannot be provided by the ECB due to the prohibition ...

This paper addresses two distinct yet interconnected problems. The first is whether the provision of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) on an individual bank basis should be centralised within the European Central Bank (ECB) and the second is whether existing liquidity financing arrangements are fit for the role. The paper argues that ELA centralisation would not require Treaty amendment and that a liquidity backstop is needed. However the latter cannot be provided by the ECB due to the prohibition of monetary financing and other Treaty and EU law requirements. The choice of the EU entity which should be entrusted with the specific mandate will largely depend on the characteristics the facility would take. The paper considers such characteristics and analyses which authority may best fit that role. The paper also suggests that a well-structured facility could have a positive broader macroprudential impact, and that a fine balance needs to be struck between the risk of moral hazard and the beneficial effect this facility may have on market confidence.

External author

Costanza A Russo Rosa M. Lastra, Queen Mary University of London

How to provide liquidity to banks after resolution in Europe’s banking union

14-11-2018

Banks deemed to be failing or likely to fail in the banking union are either put into insolvency/liquidation or enter a resolution scheme to protect the public interest. After resolution but before full market confidence is restored, the liquidity needs of resolved banks might exceed what can be met through regular monetary policy operations or emergency liquidity assistance. All liquidity needs that emerge must be met for resolution to be a success. In the euro area, this can only be done credibly ...

Banks deemed to be failing or likely to fail in the banking union are either put into insolvency/liquidation or enter a resolution scheme to protect the public interest. After resolution but before full market confidence is restored, the liquidity needs of resolved banks might exceed what can be met through regular monetary policy operations or emergency liquidity assistance. All liquidity needs that emerge must be met for resolution to be a success. In the euro area, this can only be done credibly for systemically important banks by the central bank. We discuss how to establish guarantees against possible losses in order to allow liquidity provisioning in times of resolution.

External author

Maria Demertzis, Inês Gonçalves Raposo, Pia Hüttl, Guntram Wolff (Bruegel)

Research for AGRI Committee - The CAP support beyond 2020 - Assessing the future structure of direct payments and the rural development interventions in the light of the EU agricultural and environmental challenges

15-10-2018

This study provides an assessment of the structure and type of interventions as proposed by the European Commission on the CAP beyond 2020 (Title III of the proposal COM(2018) 392). All Direct Payment and Rural development interventions have been examined in the context of the main agricultural and environmental challenges the EU faces. A set of recommendation is made for the improvement of specific instruments and to address policy priorities and level playing field concerns.

This study provides an assessment of the structure and type of interventions as proposed by the European Commission on the CAP beyond 2020 (Title III of the proposal COM(2018) 392). All Direct Payment and Rural development interventions have been examined in the context of the main agricultural and environmental challenges the EU faces. A set of recommendation is made for the improvement of specific instruments and to address policy priorities and level playing field concerns.

External author

R.A. Jongeneel; H. Silvis; K. Poppe - Wageningen UR

Abundant Liquidity and Bank Lending Activity: an Assessment of the Risks

14-09-2018

This paper assesses the risks facing the euro area banking system, as it returns to normal financial conditions without ECB support. In the first part we argue that risks to bank lending mainly stem from the transmission of external monetary policy effects that may not be aligned with ECB policies. The second part of the paper therefore offers some ideas on the need to moderate spillover effects from outside monetary policies or events. We also review how far new prudential policies, regulatory measures ...

This paper assesses the risks facing the euro area banking system, as it returns to normal financial conditions without ECB support. In the first part we argue that risks to bank lending mainly stem from the transmission of external monetary policy effects that may not be aligned with ECB policies. The second part of the paper therefore offers some ideas on the need to moderate spillover effects from outside monetary policies or events. We also review how far new prudential policies, regulatory measures and/or policies can be used to mitigate those unfavourable risks. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Economic and Monetary Affairs.

External author

Andrew HUGHES HALLETT

Excess Liquidity and Bank Lending Risks in the Euro Area

14-09-2018

Low interest rates and excess liquidity in the euro area, which exceeded €1,900 billion in September 2018, might create financial stability risks. We clarify the notion of excess liquidity and highlight that its current level is primarily the result of European Central Bank asset purchases. Overall, we conclude that financial stability risks in the euro area are low, but increased home bias and housing prices necessitate full attention from macroprudential authorities. Monetary policy tools are anyway ...

Low interest rates and excess liquidity in the euro area, which exceeded €1,900 billion in September 2018, might create financial stability risks. We clarify the notion of excess liquidity and highlight that its current level is primarily the result of European Central Bank asset purchases. Overall, we conclude that financial stability risks in the euro area are low, but increased home bias and housing prices necessitate full attention from macroprudential authorities. Monetary policy tools are anyway ill-suited to fostering financial stability objectives. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee.

External author

Zsolt DARVAS, David PICHLER

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