83

résultat(s)

Mot(s)
Type de publication
Domaine politique
Mot-clé
Date

Review of EU Enforcement Regulation for trade disputes

20-07-2020

On 12 December 2019, the European Commission adopted a proposal to amend Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 concerning the exercise of the EU's rights for the application and enforcement of international trade rules ('the Enforcement Regulation') of 15 May 2014. The Enforcement Regulation enables the EU to suspend or withdraw concessions or other obligations under international trade agreements in order to respond to breaches by third countries of international trade rules that affect the EU's commercial ...

On 12 December 2019, the European Commission adopted a proposal to amend Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 concerning the exercise of the EU's rights for the application and enforcement of international trade rules ('the Enforcement Regulation') of 15 May 2014. The Enforcement Regulation enables the EU to suspend or withdraw concessions or other obligations under international trade agreements in order to respond to breaches by third countries of international trade rules that affect the EU's commercial interests. The proposed amendments would enable the EU to impose counter-measures in situations where EU trade partners violate international trade rules and block the dispute settlement procedures included in multilateral, regional and bilateral trade agreements, thus preventing the EU from obtaining final binding rulings in its favour. The latter are required under the current EU regulation to enforce international trade rules. As the Council adopted its negotiating position on 8 April 2020 and the Committee on International Trade (INTA) of the European Parliament adopted its negotiating position on 6 July 2020, trilogue negotiations can now be launched as the next step in the legislative process. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

EU-China relations: Taking stock after the 2020 EU-China Summit

30-06-2020

The 22nd EU-China Summit, originally scheduled for March 2020, was postponed owing to the Covid-19 pandemic. While other summits were simply cancelled or postponed indefinitely, the EU and China decided to hold the summit by video-link, on 22 June 2020. This decision testifies to the importance both sides attach to taking their complex relationship forward in difficult times. The 2020 summit offered the opportunity to take stock of progress made on past commitments and to re-calibrate EU-China relations ...

The 22nd EU-China Summit, originally scheduled for March 2020, was postponed owing to the Covid-19 pandemic. While other summits were simply cancelled or postponed indefinitely, the EU and China decided to hold the summit by video-link, on 22 June 2020. This decision testifies to the importance both sides attach to taking their complex relationship forward in difficult times. The 2020 summit offered the opportunity to take stock of progress made on past commitments and to re-calibrate EU-China relations, against the backdrop of the wide-ranging fallout from the coronavirus pandemic, growing United States-China strategic rivalry, rapid geopolitical power shifts and the erosion of multilateralism. Looking at EU-China relations through the lens of the 2019 EU-China strategic outlook, China is seen as being at once a partner for cooperation and negotiation, an economic competitor and a systemic rival. China has been a cooperation and negotiating partner for the EU in several fields where interests have converged. Nonetheless, the different norms and values underlying the EU and Chinese political and economic systems have made cooperation challenging. Shared objectives do not necessarily lead to the same approaches to pursuing them. Economic competition has become fiercer in China, in the EU and in third markets. As the Chinese leadership shows growing assertiveness in disseminating alternative models of governance – at international, regional and bilateral levels, China is also acting as a systemic rival, on an increasing number of issues. The coronavirus pandemic has amplified pre-existing political and economic challenges in EU-China relations. It has exposed the EU's over-reliance on China for the supply of strategic goods and also China's confrontational 'Wolf Warrior diplomacy', which has involved the use of a wide range of tools, including disinformation campaigns, political influence and economic coercion, in an attempt to alter narratives critical of China's management of the crisis. It has also clearly demonstrated the need for a 'more robust' EU policy on China.

Hong Kong: une loi sur la sécurité imposée par Pékin?

11-06-2020

Le 28 mai 2020, le Congrès national du peuple (CNP) de la République populaire de Chine a autorisé son Comité permanent à adopter une loi sur la sécurité nationale à Hong Kong, sans passer par le Conseil législatif, l’organe parlementaire de la ville. La loi, qui devrait entrer en vigueur avant les élections législatives de Hong Kong, prévues en septembre 2020, pourrait représenter un tournant au regard du «degré élevé d’autonomie» dont bénéficie la ville et une mise en œuvre prématurée du processus ...

Le 28 mai 2020, le Congrès national du peuple (CNP) de la République populaire de Chine a autorisé son Comité permanent à adopter une loi sur la sécurité nationale à Hong Kong, sans passer par le Conseil législatif, l’organe parlementaire de la ville. La loi, qui devrait entrer en vigueur avant les élections législatives de Hong Kong, prévues en septembre 2020, pourrait représenter un tournant au regard du «degré élevé d’autonomie» dont bénéficie la ville et une mise en œuvre prématurée du processus de suppression progressive du modèle «un pays, deux systèmes», qui devait perdurer 50 ans à compter de 1997. Lors de la période de session de juin, le Parlement européen devrait débattre au sujet d’une déclaration du haut représentant.

China's democratic neighbours and coronavirus: Protecting populations without lockdowns

06-05-2020

North-east Asian countries have deep and historical economic, human and cultural connections with China, based on their geographical proximity to the latter country, and were the first to be exposed to the coronavirus contagion after its initial outbreak. They were not caught unprepared, having dealt with the SARS and the MERS epidemics in recent times. South Korea and Taiwan, in particular, have successfully showcased a model characterised by minimal restrictions on economic activities and daily ...

North-east Asian countries have deep and historical economic, human and cultural connections with China, based on their geographical proximity to the latter country, and were the first to be exposed to the coronavirus contagion after its initial outbreak. They were not caught unprepared, having dealt with the SARS and the MERS epidemics in recent times. South Korea and Taiwan, in particular, have successfully showcased a model characterised by minimal restrictions on economic activities and daily lives, where safeguarding the health of the people has not had devastating consequences for the health of the economy, as witnessed in other parts of the world. They have also showed that it is possible to effectively manage the coronavirus threat transparently, without authoritarian methods. Their models, illustrating that it is possible to implement a successful – albeit sometimes unnoticed – alternative to a liberal laissez-faire model or to a drastic lockdown, could become precious assets for public diplomacy and soft power tools. Given the high rate of information and communications technology penetration in the region, it has been easier for the authorities to make use of big data and contact-tracing by smartphone in order to prevent the pandemic from spreading, as well as collect information on those infected. However, this approach has raised issues of privacy, especially as the details collected allow the identification of those infected and could possibly expose them to stigmatisation. Despite the coronavirus outbreak, South Korea is a healthy democracy. It successfully held a general election on 15 April 2020, giving substance to the statement made by the European Parliament's President, David Sassoli: 'Democracy cannot be suspended in the face of Covid-19'.

Religion et politiques extérieures de l’Union: Un engagement croissant

12-02-2020

La religion se dessine comme une nouvelle dimension des politiques extérieures de l’Union européenne. Le présent document dresse un aperçu des principes, de la structure institutionnelle et des politiques qui sous-tendent l’approche de l’Union en matière de questions religieuses dans les pays tiers. Neuf études de cas illustrent le rôle important joué par la religion dans les politiques étrangères d’un certain nombre de pays à travers le monde.

La religion se dessine comme une nouvelle dimension des politiques extérieures de l’Union européenne. Le présent document dresse un aperçu des principes, de la structure institutionnelle et des politiques qui sous-tendent l’approche de l’Union en matière de questions religieuses dans les pays tiers. Neuf études de cas illustrent le rôle important joué par la religion dans les politiques étrangères d’un certain nombre de pays à travers le monde.

Relations commerciales de l’UE avec l’Amérique latine et les Caraïbes: Vue d’ensemble et chiffres

16-12-2019

Ensemble, les 33 pays constituant la Communauté des États latino-américains et des Caraïbes (CELAC) représentent le cinquième partenaire commercial de l’Union. L’Union a des accords à part entière avec deux groupes de pays d’Amérique latine (le Cariforum et le groupe d’Amérique centrale), un accord commercial multipartite avec trois pays de la Communauté andine (Colombie, Équateur et Pérou) et des accords en cours de modernisation avec le Mexique et le Chili. En outre, l’Union a des accords-cadres ...

Ensemble, les 33 pays constituant la Communauté des États latino-américains et des Caraïbes (CELAC) représentent le cinquième partenaire commercial de l’Union. L’Union a des accords à part entière avec deux groupes de pays d’Amérique latine (le Cariforum et le groupe d’Amérique centrale), un accord commercial multipartite avec trois pays de la Communauté andine (Colombie, Équateur et Pérou) et des accords en cours de modernisation avec le Mexique et le Chili. En outre, l’Union a des accords-cadres interrégionaux et bilatéraux avec le Mercosur et ses membres individuels. Les accords de l’Union régissant les relations commerciales avec les sous-groupes et pays d’Amérique latine et des Caraïbes diffèrent considérablement sur le plan des domaines couverts et de la méthode en fonction de l’époque où ils ont été conclus et du contexte des négociations. L’Union modernise désormais les volets commerciaux de ses accords avec le Mexique (un «accord de principe» a été conclu en avril 2018) et le Chili (négociations toujours en cours) afin de les aligner sur les normes actuelles des ALE de l’Union. Si l’accord d’association UE-Mercosur, qui comprend un volet commercial pour lequel un accord politique a été conclu en juin 2019, est ratifié avec succès, l’Union disposerait alors d’accords globaux régissant les relations commerciales avec la quasi-totalité de l’Amérique latine et des Caraïbes (à l’exception de la Bolivie, de Cuba et du Venezuela).

Lauréat du prix Sakharov 2019: Ilham Tohti

10-12-2019

L’espace d’expression de la liberté de pensée se rétrécit de façon spectaculaire à travers le monde, à mesure que l’influence géopolitique et géoéconomique des régimes autoritaires s’étend. Le prix Sakharov pour la liberté de l’esprit est donc plus important que jamais: il permet au Parlement européen d’attirer l’attention sur le sort de ceux qui s’élèvent contre la répression des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales, principes sur lesquels l’Union européenne repose et qu’elle vise à promouvoir ...

L’espace d’expression de la liberté de pensée se rétrécit de façon spectaculaire à travers le monde, à mesure que l’influence géopolitique et géoéconomique des régimes autoritaires s’étend. Le prix Sakharov pour la liberté de l’esprit est donc plus important que jamais: il permet au Parlement européen d’attirer l’attention sur le sort de ceux qui s’élèvent contre la répression des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales, principes sur lesquels l’Union européenne repose et qu’elle vise à promouvoir dans son action extérieure, conformément à l’article 21 du traité sur l’Union européenne. Le lauréat du prix Sakharov 2019 est le célèbre professeur d’économie ouïghour Ilham Tohti, défenseur modéré des droits de la minorité ouïghoure et du dialogue avec la majorité Han en Chine. En 2014, il a été condamné à la réclusion à perpétuité pour des chefs d’accusation liés au séparatisme, alors que la Chine durcissait sa politique de lutte contre l’extrémisme religieux, le séparatisme ethnique et le terrorisme – laquelle érigeait désormais l’identité ouïghoure en menace de premier ordre pour la sécurité nationale. Doté d’une récompense de 50 000 euros, le prix Sakharov sera remis lors d’une cérémonie organisée au Parlement européen au cours de la période de session de décembre à Strasbourg, en présence des autres finalistes.

China's growing role as a security actor in Africa

08-10-2019

China has emerged as an important economic, political but also security actor in Africa as a result of its 'Going out' policy officially launched in 2001, and the massive roll-out of its signature connectivity strategy, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), since 2013. The presence of Chinese citizens and economic assets in Africa has grown substantially due to China's expanding trade with, and China-funded infrastructure projects in, African countries. Many of those countries are plagued by intrastate ...

China has emerged as an important economic, political but also security actor in Africa as a result of its 'Going out' policy officially launched in 2001, and the massive roll-out of its signature connectivity strategy, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), since 2013. The presence of Chinese citizens and economic assets in Africa has grown substantially due to China's expanding trade with, and China-funded infrastructure projects in, African countries. Many of those countries are plagued by intrastate armed conflicts, jihadist terrorism or maritime piracy off their coasts. The rising number of violent attacks against Chinese workers, calls from the domestic Chinese audience for action, and surging economic loss are some of the factors that have compelled the Chinese government to react. China has shifted from uncompromising non-involvement to selective and incremental engagement in bilateral, regional and international cooperation on peace and security by nuancing, on a case-by-case basis, the narrow boundaries of its normative foreign policy framework, including the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of foreign countries, that had made a previously inward-looking China for decades a free-rider on global security, provided by the US in particular. As in other fields, China has pursued a two-pronged approach to African security issues, to defend its economic and security interests and to expand its influence in Africa. On the one hand, it has contributed to existing multilateral structures and instruments to foster peace and security. It has participated in UN-led peacekeeping missions to Africa and in the UN-mandated counter-piracy action off the Horn of Africa. Both have provided the pretext for China to accelerate its massive blue-water navy build up, to be present in the Indian Ocean and beyond and to set up its first overseas military base, in Djibouti. On the other hand, it has expanded its military presence by engaging African countries bilaterally through joint drills, military training, and military infrastructure-building and multilaterally through the newly created China-Africa fora on security issues. Against this backdrop it remains to be seen how complementary or competitive the future EU-China security cooperation, which so far has remained in its infancy, will be in seeking 'African solutions to African problems'.

International Agreements in Progress: The trade pillar of the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement

30-08-2019

On 28 June 2019, the European Union (EU) and the four founding members of Mercosur (the 'Southern Common Market') – Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay – reached an 'agreement in principle' on a free trade agreement (FTA) as part of a wider association agreement (AA). However, spurred by massive destruction of the Brazilian Amazon through large-scale forest fires, EU policy-makers and international environmental groups alike have since become increasingly vocal in expressing concerns about the ...

On 28 June 2019, the European Union (EU) and the four founding members of Mercosur (the 'Southern Common Market') – Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay – reached an 'agreement in principle' on a free trade agreement (FTA) as part of a wider association agreement (AA). However, spurred by massive destruction of the Brazilian Amazon through large-scale forest fires, EU policy-makers and international environmental groups alike have since become increasingly vocal in expressing concerns about the deal's potential environmental and climate change implications. EU farmers' associations with defensive interests have fiercely criticised what they have referred to as a 'cars for cows' deal. On the other hand, the deal has been warmly welcomed by EU industry associations and several sub-sectors of EU agriculture with offensive interests. If tariff and non-tariff barriers are eliminated or substantially lowered, the potential for growth in bi-regional trade in goods, services and investment is significant. In addition, the FTA would be a strong signal in favour of the rules-based multilateral trading system and against power politics in trade. After the agreement's legal review and translation, it will be presented to the Council for signature. It will then be submitted to the European Parliament for consent. Once the Council has adopted the decision concluding the agreement, it will be presented to EU Member State parliaments for ratification. First edition. The 'International Agreements in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the process, from initial discussions through to ratification.

EU framework for FDI screening

17-04-2019

On 13 September 2017, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a regulation establishing a framework for screening foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows into the EU on grounds of security or public order. The proposal was a response to a rapidly evolving and increasingly complex investment landscape. It aimed to strike a balance between maintaining the EU's general openness to FDI inflows and ensuring that the EU's essential interests are not undermined. Recent FDI trends and policies of ...

On 13 September 2017, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a regulation establishing a framework for screening foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows into the EU on grounds of security or public order. The proposal was a response to a rapidly evolving and increasingly complex investment landscape. It aimed to strike a balance between maintaining the EU's general openness to FDI inflows and ensuring that the EU's essential interests are not undermined. Recent FDI trends and policies of emerging FDI providers had cast doubt on the effectiveness of the decentralised and fragmented system of FDI screening – in use in only some EU Member States – to adequately address the potential (cross-border) impact of FDI inflows on security or public order without EU coordinated cooperation among all EU Member States. The proposal's objective was neither to harmonise the formal FDI screening mechanisms then used by almost half of the Member States, nor to replace them with a single EU mechanism. Instead, it aimed to enhance cooperation and information-sharing on FDI screening between the Commission and Member States, and to increase legal certainty and transparency. The European Parliament's Committee on International Trade (INTA) and the Council adopted their positions in May and June 2018 respectively, and interinstitutional negotiations concluded in November 2018 with a provisional text. That was first endorsed by the Member States' Permanent Representatives (Coreper) and by INTA in December 2018. After the text's adoption by the European Parliament and the Council in February and March 2019 respectively, it entered into force on 10 April 2019, and will apply from 11 October 2020, 18 months later. Fourth edition. The ‘EU Legislation in Progress’ briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure. Please note this document has been designed for on-line viewing.

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