Should the Marketing of Subordinated Debt Be Restricted/Different in One Way or the Other? What to Do in the Case of Mis-Selling?
Analiżi fil-Fond
17-03-2016
An important prerequisite for the efficiency of bail-in as a regulatory tool is that debt holders are able to bear the cost of a bail-in. Examining European banks’ subordinated debt we caution that households may be investors in bail-in able bonds. Since households do not fulfil the aforementioned prerequisite, we argue that European bank supervisors need to ensure that banks’ bail-in bonds are held by sophisticated investors. Existing EU market regulation insufficiently addresses mis-selling of bail-in instruments.
Analiżi fil-Fond
Awtur estern
Martin R. Götz and Tobias H. Tröger
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Kelma għat-tiftix
- bank
- DRITT
- dritt ċivili
- ekonomija monetarja
- FINANZI
- finanzjar u investiment
- governanza ekonomika (UE)
- IMPRIŻA U KOMPETIZZJONI
- istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji u kreditu
- liġi bankarja
- maniġment
- moviment liberu tal-kapital
- organizzazzjoni tal-impriżi
- protezzjoni tal-investiment
- rekwiżiti finanzjarji
- sistema bankarja
- solvenza finanzjarja
- stabbiltà finanzjarja
- superviżjoni bankarja
- ġestjoni tar-riskju
- ħruġ ta’ titoli
- żieda kapitali