An Economic Analysis of the Closure of Markets and other Dysfunctions in the Awarding of Concession Contracts
Uitgebreide analyse
15-06-2012
As concession contracts are long-term agreements that are inherently incomplete, the economic literature suggests that rigid award rules are inadequate. We suggest that the Directive for the awarding of concession contracts should contain a balanced mix of flexible and rigid rules, as well as procedures to increase the transparency and accountability of contracting parties. This briefing note provides suggestions in order to avoid the closure of markets and other dysfunctions in the awarding of concession contracts.
Uitgebreide analyse
Externe auteur
Stéphane SAUSSIER (Sorbonne Business School)
Nadere informatie over dit document
Publicatietype
Zoekterm
- burgerlijk recht
- clausule
- concessieovereenkomsten voor dienstverlening
- concurrentie
- ECONOMIE, VERKEER EN HANDELSVERKEER
- handelsbeleid
- inschrijving op een aanbesteding
- mededingingsregeling
- ONDERNEMING EN CONCURRENTIE
- openbaarheid van het bestuur
- openbare aanbesteding
- POLITIEK
- RECHT
- uitvoerende macht en overheidsadministratie